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Abstract: Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally
public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In
this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of inten-
tionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this
context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen
Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere,
I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the
capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with
democratic self-determination.
Keywords: privacy, surveillance, public sphere, speech acts, Jürgen Habermas
1 Introduction
On January 15, 2015, groups in New York City associated with the ‘Black Lives
Matter’ movement organized a protest at Grand Central Station. As we now know,
officers of the NYPD monitored that protest, took photos of individual participants
and made records of their movements and actions (Joseph 2015), just as they and
other agencies did at other protests regarding similar matters, including the
‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement (Schmidt and Moynihan 2012). Going back some-
what further in history, it is well-known that leaders of the Civil Rights movement
were subject to intense surveillance by the FBI (see Garrow 2010), as were other
members of civil society movements. This is not an exclusively American phe-
nomenon. In the UK, the Metropolitan Police was found in 2009 to have stored
details on thousands of activists in a database for years (Lewis and Vallée 2009),
including details about their participation in various protests. Police forces in
various other democratic countries regularly film peaceful protests and send
undercover informants to gather information on participants and their political
activities (Fijnaut and Marx 1995; Electronic Privacy Information Center 2019).
Unsurprisingly, non-liberal countries have even less compunction about subject-
ing civil society actors to surveillance (Security Without Borders 2019).
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Anecdotal evidence shows that many people feel uneasy about these cases,
not merely because of the risk that the data gathered by such surveillance might
be abused in a way that interferes with people’s constitutional rights. The
systematic gathering of information on peaceful political activities seems to
raise ethical and political problems even if such abuse is sufficiently unlikely.
This is not merely true when the surveillance intentionally focuses on political
activities. Many people also worry that indiscriminate mass surveillance will
have a chilling effect on democracy precisely because it will necessarily include
surveillance of people’s political activities (Haggerty and Samatas 2010; The
New York Times Editorial Board 2013). These worries become even more urgent
when we consider the potential of facial recognition technologies and the fact
that public spaces also extend to social media platforms.
Traditional philosophical theories of privacy offer us relatively little help in
making sense of these worries. The very idea of privacy had traditionally been
linked to the idea of a ‘private sphere,’ most centrally the private home and the
family, which was seen as especially deserving of protection. But even though
most theorists do not restrict the notion of privacy to the private sphere in this
sense today, the intuition that privacy rights only protect activities from obser-
vation by others that are not already public is still widely shared in both
philosophy and the law. In the American context this intuition plays out through
the idea of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ which plays a central role in
relevant jurisprudence (Winn 2009), whereas in the European context courts
have consistently held that a person has privacy rights if she makes a reasonable
effort to protect her activities from public scrutiny.
Once privacy protections are conditioned in this way, political activities like
the ones mentioned at the beginning of this section seem to be clearly excluded
from them. Not only do they typically take place in public spaces where no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, but they are also consciously designed
to attract public attention and thus seem to amount to an effort to forego
privacy. If state agencies collect information on such activities, they therefore
do not seem to be violating any privacy rights.
On further inspection, things are a bit more complicated. On the one hand,
there is a growing body of legal and philosophical literature on the idea of
‘privacy in public’ that challenges the idea that public activities do not deserve
privacy protection by definition (Timan et al. 2017; Newell et al. 2018; Moreham
2006; Reidenberg 2014; Nissenbaum 1997; Roessler 2016). As I will show, how-
ever, in this literature the idea of privacy in public is even mostly limited to what
I will call accidentally public activities — activities such as traveling to work and
going shopping, which are de facto impossible to perform in private but which
do not depend in any substantive sense on occurring in public view. Political
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activities, by contrast, are intentionally public. Their very point depends on the
public’s being addressed, and the agents therefore typically seek public
attention.
On the other hand, courts in different legal systems have frequently
restricted the power of the police to monitor political expression based on the
idea that such constraint is necessary to protect political rights (see Levinson-
Waldman 2017). Just why political rights depend on privacy, however, often
remains unexplored in judicial reasoning.
In this paper, I will offer a new and distinctive argument for the claim that
privacy protections for intentionally public behavior (such as political speech)
are justified because of their contribution to collective autonomy and democratic
self-government. My argument will draw on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of delib-
erative democracy. Habermas holds that democracy depends on the possibility
of public deliberation which requires specific forms of communication between
citizens that are institutionally secured by what he calls the public sphere. I will
extend this idea and show that surveillance of public speech undermines the
possibility of specific forms of speech and therefore restricts the liberty of
citizens to a potentially problematic degree.
The argument will proceed as follows: In section two, I will survey some
existing approaches to the problem of privacy in public. I will argue that many
of these privilege the protection of accidentally public activities over that of
intentionally public activities. In section three, I will use Helen Nissenbaum’s
contextualist defense of privacy in public to argue that we need to pay attention
to the specific goods provided by the public sphere and that Habermas’s theory
offers us a plausible account of these goods. As Habermas does not discuss the
problem of surveillance, I combine the speech-act theoretic foundations of his
theory in section four with recent insights in feminist philosophy of language to
argue that surveillance is a form of participation in a speech community that
undermines the capacity of other participants to speak as they intend to, thus
threatening their communicative freedom. I conclude that a democratic under-
standing of privacy in public provides the best rationale for protecting the
privacy of participants in intentionally public activities.
2 Philosophical approaches to privacy in public
Although this paper is primarily interested in the question whether there should
be limits on the surveillance of intentionally public speech — which I assume to
be the core activity that enables and is enabled by a public sphere — in this
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section I will consider the issue of privacy in public in a more general sense that
relates to all activities conducted in contexts that are epistemically accessible to
unspecified others without constraint and therefore public in a more ordinary
sense. I argue that the very idea of privacy in public is consistent and that its
force depends on the presupposed value of constraints on acquiring and sharing
information; I then identify a number of arguments why such constraints could
be valuable in the case of public behavior that relate to their value for the agents
and for society as a whole.
The consistency of the idea of privacy in public has been questioned by
theorists who define privacy in access terms (Gavison 2012). If privacy is defined
in terms of whether someone has access to information about you, the very fact of
doing anything in public (again, meaning in a context where unspecified others
are not blocked from acquiring information about you and where such informa-
tion acquisition does not in itself violate any norms or rights) will lead to an
unavoidable loss of privacy, and, consequently, there will be no form of privacy
that can be protected by social norms or legal rules (Parent 1983). By contrast,
once we think of privacy in control terms, i. e. as the state of being in control over
who has access to information, then the idea of privacy in public becomes at least
intelligible. ‘Going public’ need not be accompanied by a loss of control — in fact,
we can usefully distinguish between wanted and unwanted forms of public
visibility. Of course, one can argue that if one decides to make information
about oneself public, one merely enjoys control at the moment of decision, but
will lack ongoing control once the information is made public. Thus, every public
activity will, again, incur a loss of privacy. However, this is too simple a picture.
While it is true that once other people are in possession of information about
oneself one cannot meaningfully be certain about the ways in which that infor-
mation will be used and communicated, social, legal and other norms can ensure
that some degree of control — and thus privacy — is retained (Inness 1996, p. 50).
In fact, such control is enabled by the fact that courts in many jurisdictions
have consistently affirmed a right to privacy in public. In the European context,
the German Federal Constitutional Court has held that there are privacy rights
for activities that happen outside the home or similar private spaces, as long as
the secluded character of the location allows the agents to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1999). This limitation was
partly removed by the European Court of Human Rights (European Court of
Human Rights 2004, par. 75 and 77), which held that the possibility of a private
life is incompatible with permanent surveillance of one’s public conduct (for a
more detailed overview of European case law, see also Vermeulen 2014).
Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court has recently held that ‘Privacy, as
ordinarily understood, is not an all-or-nothing concept, and being in a public
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or semi-public space does not automatically negate all expectations of privacy
with respect to observation or recording.’ (Supreme Court of Canada 2019).
This clearly shows that people can enjoy control over information about
epistemically public activities; the question whether surveillance of intentionally
public activities is compatible with a right to privacy therefore cannot be solved
by referring to the semantics of ‘privacy.’ We need to investigate the normative
arguments behind different conceptions of such a right.
It has often been argued that people have an obligation to ignore informa-
tion about others that is, in principle, easily accessible (‘to avert the gaze’ or to
display ‘civil inattention’ (Goffman 1963)), for a number of reasons that are often
connected to more general views about the value of privacy (see Roessler 2016;
Nagel 1998; Patton 2000). First, privacy in public can be argued to straightfor-
wardly serve the value of protecting people’s individual liberty (Reidenberg
2014; de Bruin 2010). If everyone’s public activities are observed and information
about them stored by the government or other powerful parties, this increases
the risk that people’s rights will be violated by the observers (for example, when
the observers secretly enter the homes of the observed at a time when they are
known to be absent) and that such rights violations will remain undetected.
Correspondingly, knowledge of such surveillance undermines people’s reason-
able belief that they are not at risk of such right violations. Thus, even if such
violations do not occur, this knowledge can prompt them to take costly precau-
tions, creating obstacles to autonomous choice in other domains.
Second, the impact of knowing that all of one’s public activities — such as
one’s movements, one’s shopping habits, one’s conversations outside of private
spaces, and even one’s expressions of emotion — can be constantly captured
and potentially communicated to everyone, is clearly enormous not only in a
psychological sense, but also in respect to one’s sense of dignity. This impact
threatens to destroy any meaningful opportunity to live one’s life autonomously,
at least given the present structure of society which makes it impossible to avoid
any such disclosure (Westin 1970, p. 31; Roessler 2004, p. 87), as well as one’s
sense of having a status as a human being with inherent dignity (Floridi 2016).
Third, authors have drawn on John Stuart Mill’s intuition that democratic
societies always run the risk of establishing a ‘tyranny of the majority’ that
imposes its particular views regarding the good life or regarding proper behavior
on non-consenting minorities, precluding not only ‘experiments in living’ but
also any meaningful development of a sense of individuality (Lever 2006). As
long as universal tolerance remains an unachieved ideal, intentional non-atten-
tion in public seems to form one of the most promising social practices that
allow people with wildly different conceptions of the good life to refrain from
interfering with each other (Nagel 1998; Mokrosinska 2017).
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Fourth, authors have argued more generally that privacy in public is a
necessary extension of the private space that people need to develop both their
individual autonomy and their intimate relationships with others. Such authors
typically reject the misleading spatial connotation of the idea of a ‘private space’
as constrained to particular environments. According to such a view, ‘private
space’ refers to having the opportunities for intimacy and for the presentation of
different aspects of the self in different contexts (Rachels 1975; Roessler and
Mokrosinska 2015; Roessler 2016). As such opportunities tend to be undermined
by the unrestricted availability of all information to those with whom one interacts
socially, restrictions are necessary. On this view, there is no need, however, for a
separate argument for privacy in public as opposed to other forms.
These four arguments refer to the value of privacy in public for the agent
whose public behavior is potentially observed or shared with others. It is there-
fore unsurprising that what is protected by the relevant norms are primarily
those forms of public behavior that are merely accidentally public, i. e. those that
do not depend on publicity and that the agent would reasonably want to remove
from public scrutiny if she could. Agents often lack meaningful opportunities to
conduct all relevant activities in non-public contexts; in the least, such a choice
can be prohibitively inconvenient and expensive. Our legal norms solve this
conundrum, shielding such activities from the risks that usually go along with
public actions.
By contrast, these arguments do not work well for intentionally public
behavior, in particular for forms of communication by which agents choose to
address an unspecified public. Engaging in such communication is often seen as
a deliberate choice to give up privacy, to incur the psychological costs of public
scrutiny and to expose oneself to evaluation by the majority. Quite plausibly,
protecting people’s intentionally public speech against surveillance is also not
necessary for intimacy or individual self-exploration. Once we have to make
trade-offs between the protection of different forms of privacy, these arguments
will therefore naturally lead us towards giving up the privacy of intentionally
public activities first (see also Stahl 2019).
A large part of privacy jurisprudence is ultimately based on one of these
arguments – while in the EU’s GDPR the role of human dignity is more prom-
inent (see European Parliament 2016, Article 88) and in the U.S. and Canadian
context liberty and autonomy are the more important values, respectively (Levin
and Nicholson 2005, pp. 382 ff.), the different justifications of privacy agree in
their individualist orientation. It is therefore not surprising that, for example, the
European Convention of Human Rights limits the right to privacy explicitly to
‘private and family life’ (European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1998, Article 8). Courts in many jurisdictions
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have excluded activities from protection that do not allow for a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ (Wilkins 1987), most prominently in the United States,
where this standard has historically resulted in courts accepting the ‘third party
doctrine’ that entails that, once people share information with others, they lose
any reasonable expectation of privacy (for an overview, see Issacharoff and
Wirsha 2016). This doctrine, which is rooted, first, in the idea that privacy
protects the individual’s choice to share information and, second, in the idea
that the possibility of such choices does not necessitate securing further control
after sharing, has recently come under attack for its counter-intuitive implica-
tions regarding digital technology which almost always involves third-party
providers and which thus threatens to destroy the possibility of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in its entirety. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor thus
raised the question whether the third-party doctrine falsely treats ‘secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy’ (United States Supreme Court 2012, par. 957). However,
even such criticism reflects continuing adherence to the idea that a ‘reasonable
expectation’ of being unobserved is a precondition for the applicability of
privacy rights. This rules out privacy protections for intentionally public activ-
ities, such as political speech. While courts also sometimes limit state surveil-
lance of political protest (e. g. in European Court of Human Rights 2019), such
judgments are often based either on the issue of ‘personal information’, on the
assumption of ‘chilling effects’ (e. g. in United States Supreme Court 1963) or on
a rather unclear connection between privacy and freedom of expression.
If one wants to take seriously the often-cited intuition that ubiquitous
surveillance is a danger to democracy, it is therefore essential to provide a better
rationale for protecting the privacy of intentionally public activities.
3 The context of the public sphere
In this section, I will turn to a different approach to the problem of privacy in
public that has been developed by Helen Nissenbaum (Nissenbaum 1997, 2010,
2004). While I endorse Nissenbaum’s general approach, I will argue that she
needs a substantive conception of the public sphere to develop a theory that
leads to meaningful recommendations. For this purpose, I will introduce Jürgen
Habermas’s theory of the public sphere. In the next section, I will argue that his
theory allows us to understand a thus far neglected dimension of harms that
follow from a lack of privacy in public.
Nissenbaum — mainly drawing on examples of commercial data collection —
argues that the traditional debate about privacy in public includes a number of
Privacy in Public 7
mistaken assumptions. The most important of these is the assumption that there is
a realm of public information to which no privacy norms apply (Nissenbaum 1997,
p. 213). Not only is this assumption not borne out in jurisprudence, but it turns out
that what is often called ‘public space’ in a simplifying manner is actually best
understood as a multiplicity of contexts (Nissenbaum 1998, p. 215) that are
structured by distinct normative expectations concerning the handling of infor-
mation. Thus, not only is there no single public space, but among all the different
contexts that belong to ‘the public’, there is also none which is free of restrictions.
In her subsequent work, Nissenbaum extends this contextualist argument
towards a general theory of privacy. Rather than adopting an account according
to which privacy protects a single value across all areas of social life,
Nissenbaum proposes that we view the main function of privacy as protecting
‘contextual integrity.’ The idea behind this is that we can distinguish between a
number of nested contexts in society, each of which comes with a distinct cluster
of roles, values, norms and activities (Nissenbaum 2010, p. 133), such as med-
icine, universities, the family, religion, and the marketplace. In each of these
contexts, we find distinct sets of norms regarding the flow of information
(Nissenbaum 2010, pp. 145ff., 2004, pp. 120ff.), in particular about what it is
appropriate to reveal and how information can be distributed. These norms are
not merely empirically accepted; they enjoy prima facie justification because
they safeguard the capacity of contexts to produce specific goods. Nissenbaum
here draws on Michael Walzer’s theory of complex equality (Walzer 1983).
Whereas Walzer holds that specific social contexts constitute the meaning of
specific goods and that the meaning of ‘equal distribution’ can only be defined
relative to the meaning of the good in question, Nissenbaum makes a parallel
argument for the case of information and privacy.
This contextualist argument, Nissenbaum argues convincingly, is able to do
without the idea that privacy is bound to a specific sphere of the private to
which the sphere of the public is contrasted as one that is free of constraints.
Rather, she proposes that we reformulate that distinction as one between differ-
ent contexts governed by their own norms. She is successful in establishing that
this better matches both jurisprudence and citizens’ normative expectations
about surveillance in public. However, while she offers a framework for thinking
about privacy in public she does not adopt any substantive view about the
content of the distinctive goods and values of the public spheres under discus-
sion, that is, political public spheres. If we are to avoid dogmatically assuming
that current practices in these spheres are legitimate merely due to having been
established, we need some conception of what the distinctive good of the
political public is in order to have a critical standard with which to measure
both our practice and our intuitions.
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I am going to propose that we extend Nissenbaum’s argument by supple-
menting it with Jürgen Habermas’s normative theory of the public sphere. This
has several advantages. Not only does Habermas offer a clear answer to the
question of what the good supplied by a specifically political public sphere
consists in, his theory of the public sphere is also sociologically grounded, tied
to a normative theory of democracy, and widely accepted as one of the most
advanced analyses of that concept.
On Habermas’s account, the good that is supplied by the public sphere is
legitimacy. In his social theory, he argues that the administrative state apparatus
is dependent on a supply of legitimation that it cannot itself produce (Habermas
1975). The reason for this is to be found in a basic distinction between two
modes of action coordination. Actions can be coordinated either strategically or
communicatively. In a strategic mode of action coordination, participants are
oriented towards the consequences their actions will have, given the strategic
action orientations of others which provide the motivation to select certain
options. In a communicative mode of action coordination, by contrast, actions
are coordinated through participants’ reaching an intersubjective agreement
about what is to be done. The potential for such intersubjective agreement is
to be found in the human capacity for communication. Participants in a practice
engage in communicative action when they coordinate their interaction through
the raising and evaluation of validity claims, that is, claims about the truth of
propositions, the rightness of courses of action and the sincerity of expressions
of their inner states. While such claims can always be questioned by others, in
which case the speaker must supply reasons for them, once all participants are
genuinely communicatively motivated they are committed to accept those claims
which they endorse after an exchange of reasons as binding on their own
behavior.
Genuine communicative interaction in which participants are unreservedly
committed to coordinating their interaction through communication can be
contrasted with strategic forms of interaction. In the latter forms, communica-
tion in a weak sense is also necessary for informing others of one’s orientations
and interests, but the communicative exchange does not serve as the source of
motivation for participants (Habermas 1984/1981, vol. 1, pp. 95 and 283). It only
helps them to adequately calculate the consequences of actions. Habermas
holds that modern societies have differentiated themselves into a number of
contexts which we can analyze as purely strategically coordinated, such as the
state administration and the market economy. In these contexts, linguistic
interaction has been replaced by media (power and money) which enable
efficient large-scale cooperation free of the inefficiency of establishing commu-
nicative consensus (Habermas 1984/1981, vol. 2, p. 281). It is impossible,
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however, to convert the entirety of society to these modes of action coordination,
since strategically coordinated contexts cannot reproduce the elements of the
‘lifeworld’ (Habermas 1984/1981, vol. 2, pp. 119ff.) — that is, meaning, normative
consensus and personality structures — which are preconditions for all success-
ful social integration.
In particular, as Habermas lays out in his political theory, the legitimacy of
political decisions ultimately depends on their normative acceptability which
can only be established through free deliberation. Deliberation is a distinctive
mode of communicative action that is tied to the institutional context of the
public sphere. The public sphere is a concept that Habermas repeatedly exam-
ines throughout his career (most extensively in Habermas 1991/1962, 1996). It
denotes a paradigmatic social practice in which citizens are relieved of their
roles as private members of the family or private economic actors, along with
their participation in administrative decision-making, and engage with each
other on an equal basis to determine the normatively correct response to matters
of common interest. For Habermas, it is such deliberation, rather than voting,
that is the basic practice of democracy and the only possible source of legiti-
macy (Habermas 1996, p. 296, 1994).
While Habermas readily acknowledges that the notion of an ideal deliber-
ative situation is an idealization (Habermas 1996, p. 19), he holds that this
idealization has empirical effects: If people can act under the presumption
that they are interacting with others in a genuine communicative manner, this
has social effects that allow for the emergence of specific social forms of
integration. What is thereby presumed is that everyone engaged in the inter-
action is committed to a set of communicative norms that establish equality,
openness, genuine argumentative commitment and freedom as principles of the
debate (Habermas 1996, p. 305). Historically, these presumptions have taken the
form of constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, the institution of a free
press and the emergence of forums which have at least aspired to overcome
divisions of class and gender.
This conception of the public sphere not only clarifies the specific goods
that are at stake in that social context but is also rooted in a view about the
pragmatics of language that allows Habermas to generate sociologically inter-
esting insights into the kinds of norm violations that can undermine the func-
tioning of the public sphere. Habermas’s pragmatics draws, in particular, on
Austin’s distinction between illocutionary acts (acts that one performs by saying
something, such as making a promise or warning someone) and perlocutionary
acts (acts that one performs through saying something in light of the extra-
linguistic consequences of it being said, such as frightening someone, see Austin
1962, pp. 98 and 102). The possibility of genuine communicative action consists,
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on Habermas’s view, in the participants’ capacity to perform illocutionary acts of
raising validity claims. This capacity both depends on subjective competence
and requires a specific uptake by others, which is a precondition for the
possibility of such speech acts in the first place. You can perform such speech
acts successfully only if others relate to you as a member of a communicative
community.
This gives Habermas’s theory a critical dimension which is cashed out by
his theory of ‘colonization’ (Habermas 1984/1981, vol. 2, pp. 332ff.) – a notion
that is already implicit in his early work on the public sphere (Habermas
1991/1962, p. 160). The public sphere is endangered once administrative and
commercial actors intervene in the lifeworld in order to solve the crises of the
respective subsystems, either economic or political. When these subsystems
begin to distort the cultural integrative processes of the lifeworld through the
juridification of family relations, the modern welfare state, or the emergence
of public relations and the strategically calculated creation of loyalty in
modern politics, then instrumental action orientations begin to replace gen-
uinely communicative intentions (Habermas 1984/1981 vol. 2, p. 323) which in
turn undermines the capacity of communicatively integrated spheres to play
their distinctive role and leads either to legitimation crises or to pathologies
of alienation and social disintegration.
This description of colonization adds sociological depth to Nissenbaum’s
idea that the violation of contextual norms endangers the integration of specific
contexts. However, Habermas’s high-level social theory does not yet answer the
question of what specific role informational norms play. It merely creates room
for the hypothesis that privacy in public might be more than merely necessary
for the safeguarding of liberty. Once one realizes that the driving forces behind
contemporary forms of systematic surveillance of public activities are almost
exclusively strategically motivated actors – the police, intelligence services and
corporations – we can ask more specifically about whether it might be an
essential dimension of the value of privacy in public that it can serve to protect
the conditions of genuinely communicative action against colonization from the
administrative or economic subsystems.
While Habermas’s theory extends Nissenbaum’s account to provide a plau-
sible conception of what is at stake in the specific context of deliberative,
political publics, I will argue in the next section that the harm done to the
public sphere by strategically motivated surveillance can only emerge if we
engage in analysis of the speech-act theoretic foundations of communicative
action and the role that social context plays in the capacities and roles of both
speakers and listeners in public spheres.
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4 How surveillance can undermine the public
sphere
In the last section, I examined Habermas’s conception of the public sphere in
order to identify the specific goods that are at stake in the context of the
public. In this section, I will argue that certain forms of surveillance and
observation both diminish the public sphere’s ability to supply these goods
and that they do so in a freedom-undermining way. While I have so far
operated with a relatively vague concept of surveillance, the argument that
follows will be concerned with surveillance in a more distinctive sense. In
contrast to mere information-gathering or monitoring, I take surveillance to be
a form of monitoring that is motivated by strategic interests and, in particular,
with monitoring the behavior of people and the relation of this behavior to the
monitoring agent’s interests (Marx 2015; Dandeker 1990, p. 37). As such,
surveillance is intrinsically tied to strategic action contexts. Furthermore, in
the examples that I discuss, I will mostly be concerned with surveillance
exercised by distinctively strategically motivated actors—such as administra-
tive or corporate actors—and less with the increasingly important phenomenon
of mutual, ‘synoptic’ (Mathiesen 1997) surveillance. Even though I take my
arguments also to have implications for the latter phenomenon, I do not
explore them here.
It has to be noted that Habermas never considers the question whether privacy
in public, that is, the existence of rules which protect public spheres from surveil-
lance, is a precondition of functioning of those public spheres. There are two reasons
for this. First, when Habermas talks about privacy, he takes that concept to denote
the opportunity of retreating from public view into a private sphere where certain
forms of self-discovery are possible. When he argues that ‘the constitutional protec-
tion of “privacy” promotes the integrity of private life spheres [and] circumscribes an
untouchable zone of personal integrity and independent judgment’ (Habermas 1996,
p. 368), he thereby identifies a precondition of political participation, but one which
is secured outside of the public sphere (for an extension of this argument regarding
the ‘stunting of social and personal development’, see Parsons 2015, p. 7).
Second, when Habermas considers the range of interventions that under-
mine the integrity of the public sphere, he focuses exclusively on the role of
speakers. In particular, he identifies those interventions as the main problem
through which strategic intentions migrate covertly into seemingly communica-
tive contexts, such as through public relations or the strategic engineering of
political consensus (Habermas 1984/1981, vol. 2, p. 346). In these cases, speakers
engage in ‘latently strategic interaction’ (Cook 2004, p. 64), i. e. forms of
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communication ‘in which the speaker inconspicuously employs illocutionary
results for perlocutionary purposes’ (Habermas 1984/1981, vol. 1, p. 305). He
never considers, however, whether surveillance — which is clearly an activity
through which agents are mostly involved in the role of the hearer — can also
have undermining effects.
It is relatively obvious why latently strategic speech undermines the functioning
of communicatively integrated spheres. If there are speakers who merely pretend to
be motivated by communicative intentions in order to strategically manipulate
others to accept some point of view, this risks more than undermining — once
discovered — the argumentative force of their own communicative acts. Once
participants know that there is a risk that rises above a certain threshold (Cooke
1997, p. 87) that others will participate insincerely in communicative practices, this
will also lead to a generalized suspicion towards others’ attempts to enter into
deliberation, thereby making the success of such deliberation unlikely.
Similarly, one can easily extend Habermas’s arguments to understand what
is problematic with ‘coercive surveillance’ (Parsons et al. 2015, p. 218) practices
in which information is gathered for the purpose of sanctioning speakers for
their views. Entertaining the possibility that one’s political speech may lead to
losing one’s job, being imprisoned or socially excluded may have a coercive
effect that directly conflicts with Habermas’s requirement that deliberation must
be (as far as possible) free from coercion (Habermas 1990, p. 198). The ‘chilling
effects’ of surveillance that result from this mechanism on discourse have been
explored empirically (Penney 2016, 2017). It is important to note, however, that
the main discourse-undermining force associated with them is not to be located
in the surveillance practices themselves, but in the psychological effects of
either the actual risk of sanctions established by actors outside of the discourse,
or of the speaker’s beliefs about the likelihood of such sanctions (Penney 2016,
pp. 126 ff.). While very often, refraining from surveillance is the only realistic
way to avoid generating chilling effects, the root cause of these effects are the
coercive psychological consequences of sanction threats, not changes in the
structure of discourse.
In what follows, a different argument will be explored that focuses on the
effects of surveillance on the internal structure of deliberative practices that are
under surveillance by agents of either the state bureaucracy or commercial
enterprises that merely listen, observe and record information without actively
participating in the communicative exchange. According to Habermas, we will
have to classify such actors as purely strategically motivated due to their role in
the media-steered subsystems of the state and the market. But Habermas never
considers the effects of strategically motivated listening on communicative
contexts.
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In order to examine these effects, I will move beyond Habermas’s theory
towards other, more recent attempts to analyze the structures of communication
on the basis of speech-act theory, mainly by feminist philosophers of language.
Much of this work focuses on an idea developed by John Austin, namely the idea
that illocutionary acts, in order to be successfully performed, depend on certain
kinds of ‘uptake’ by their audience.
For example, Austin writes that
[u]nless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily,
successfully performed. […] I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears
what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. (1962, p. 115)
This straightforwardly entails that people can be blocked from performing
certain illocutionary acts successfully if the social conditions are such that
they cannot secure the necessary uptake. As part of an unrelated argument,
Donald Davidson provides the classic example for this by imagining a situation
in which a stage actor attempts to warn the audience that there is a fire by
shouting ‘Fire!’ but fails to actually warn them because they consider it part of
the play and thus do not provide the necessary uptake (Davidson 1984, p. 7).
This gives us a first clue as to how the interaction with listeners shapes the
capacities of speakers. Rae Langton has famously taken up this argument with
the idea of ‘illocutionary disablement’ (Langton 1993, p. 315) which amounts to a
form of silencing. She argues that an actor can be silenced,
not in the sense of rendering his spoken words inaudible or written marks illegible, but in
the sense of depriving those sounds and marks of illocutionary force: of preventing those
utterances from counting as the actions they were intended to be. (Langton 1993, p. 316)
While Langton discusses silencing mainly in the context of situations where
people are denied the authority to perform certain speech acts, I hold that the
more general insight of this argument can also be applied to the phenomenon of
strategically motivated passive participation as it arises in situations of state or
commercial surveillance of public speech. Before I am able to do so, however, a
number of issues need to be further examined.
Imagine that a group of people have gathered to protest government inac-
tion in the face of a threatening environmental crisis. As part of their public
protest, a speaker lays out a moral argument for the need to change the govern-
ment’s policies. Alongside the protesters and passersby who stop to listen to the
speech, there is a small group of plainclothes police officers in the audience who
were assigned the task of making a list of attendees and of the points they make
in their speeches. While these officers may or may not also be listening to what
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is being said as citizens and evaluating the arguments on their merits, they are
clearly also listening in another capacity, as bearers of a functional role. In this
role, they refrain from taking up the arguments as arguments and treat them (or
play their part in a larger collective epistemic procedure by which the arguments
are treated) as evidence for what the speaker believes and as establishing some
probability of her acting in certain ways in the future. In other words, while the
speaker’s intention is presumably to raise a normative validity claim, the uptake
that her statements receive is one by which they are treated as testimony about
her mental state and dispositions.
While it might seem at first glance that this already establishes that the
speaker is silenced by being denied the desired uptake, this is not the case. First,
in almost all cases, there will be a part of the audience that still treats the
arguments as validity claims (the fellow protesters and passersby). Second, and
perhaps more importantly, according to the dominant view in speech act theory
the officers in the example do not fail to provide the desired uptake. According
to this view, in order for an illocutionary act to receive uptake it is sufficient that
the audience correctly recognizes the speaker’s intention to perform such an act
(Hornsby and Langton 1998; Tanesini 2018). The problem in Davidson’s theater
example, on this account, is that the audience does not recognize the speaker’s
illocutionary intention, whereas in the present example the officers most likely
do recognize that the speaker has the intention of raising a validity claim,
although they do not respond to that intention in the desired way. To use an
even more obvious example: If you warn me that the Illuminati are after me but I
consider you deluded and take your warning only as evidence of your mental
state, then one might say that you were in fact able to perform the speech act of
warning, albeit in some sense unsuccessfully, and therefore were not silenced.
You merely failed to be taken seriously. Not being taken seriously, however, is
not the same as not being able to perform a speech act.
For these reasons, surveillance does not directly result in silencing.
However, I will argue that it may have the effect of indirectly silencing speakers
in virtue of the unintended but recognizable perlocutionary effects that it
attaches to speech acts. The issue in the example is not that the speaker is
unable to perform certain speech acts but that she cannot avoid doing so without
also doing something else. While the speaker succeeds in raising a validity claim,
she can do so only by simultaneously also supplying the strategically motivated
listeners evidence about her mental states, which is taken up by them in
unintended ways. Informally, one could say that the speaker intends to merely
perform the act of raising a validity claim, but that option has been removed by
the surveillance agent. It has been replaced with another option that consists in
performing two actions at once: raising a validity claim (and performing the
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associated speech act) and providing evidence about her mental states. This
remains the case even when we admit that the sincerely communicatively
motivated part of the audience provides the speaker with the desired uptake
and takes her seriously, and even when the speaker is unaware of the surveil-
lance. The second element in this option bundle — providing evidence about
one’s mental states — is not an illocutionary act that the speaker performs,
however, since she has no intention to that effect (in the standard case) that
could be correctly recognized by the audience. That others acquire knowledge
about the speaker’s mental states is rather an unintended perlocutionary effect
of the speech act.
As such, this is not yet problematic. In almost any speech situation, what we
say will affect our audience in various intended or unintended ways, and
typically we cannot avoid a variety of perlocutionary effects. Indeed, most
communicatively motivated members of the audience of a political speech will
typically also acquire certain beliefs about the thoughts of the speaker, although
inducing such beliefs is not intended by the speaker.
The problem in the surveillance case is not this general phenomenon but the
specific social dynamic that it generates. This dynamic has two parts. The first
part is one in which surveillance undermines communicative speaker roles. Put
briefly, once a speaker knows that her speech act will generate a certain perlocu-
tionary effect on a part of the audience that is strategically relevant to her, it
makes it rational for her to view her own speech no longer exclusively under the
description of producing validity claims but also as part of a strategic interaction
with the relevant part of the audience. In other words, knowledge about (the risk
of) producing such effects rationally induces the speaker to reconceive her
conversational role in a way that introduces a new set of motivations as role-
appropriate, a change which then undermines the idealizing assumption that all
participants are communicatively motivated which is necessary for participating
in a deliberative situation. Not all foreseeable perlocutionary effects have this
consequence—when I do not anticipate that those effects will be strategically
relevant to me in that they inform further interactions with those whom they
affect in a non-communicative mode, they provide no rational motivation to step
out of the communicative role-understanding. However, in many cases of gov-
ernmental or commercial surveillance of deliberation, speakers who are aware of
the surveillance are rationally justified in anticipating that there will be a risk
that the records which their speech creates (which are typically persistent and
available to an a priori undefined range of agents) will inform further non-
communicative interactions that affect their interests.
What does it mean for a speaker to react in this way to surveillance? If she is
partly strategically motivated in terms of how she presents herself, she cannot
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openly attempt to get surveillance agents to believe that she has certain beliefs
or intentions. Such an attempt would most likely be self-defeating. Rather, she
must couch her seemingly sincerely communicatively motivated arguments in
terms that make it likely that the surveillance agents will draw inferences that
she thinks are in her interest. In other words, the most rational way for a speaker
to influence her strategic position is to engage in latently strategic action.
Of course, this is not to claim that this always happens. Speakers can (and
perhaps often should) resist the temptation to consider the strategic effects of
their speech. This is where the second part of the dynamic comes in — the part
that concerns the effects of the possibility of surveillance on an initially com-
municatively motivated audience. Assume that the audience knows that there is
a risk of surveillance, and they assume that this fact is epistemically accessible
to the speaker. On the basis of the above argument, they must conclude both
that it is rational for the speaker to consider communicative and strategic
considerations when raising validity claims and that this is therefore (at least
somewhat) likely to happen. This will undermine their trust that, in any given
case, the speaker’s actual speech acts are purely communicatively motivated,
i. e. that the speaker is ‘unreservedly pursuing illocutionary aims’ (Habermas
1984/1981, vol. 1, p. 305). Rather, they must take into account the possibility that
the speaker is engaged in latently strategic action. This possibility, however, will
undermine the communicative force of the speech act (Cooke 1997, p. 87): Once I
suspect that someone is raising a validity claim merely to latently pursue
perlocutionary aims, the relevant ‘speech acts are robbed of their illocutionary
binding and bonding power’ (Habermas 1998, p. 332). It is important to note that
this differs from the coercion argument discussed above, insofar it does not
assume that discourse-external risks do not allow speakers to freely participate,
but rather that their objectively changed role within the discourse makes reasons
available to them for changing their behavior that others then can rationally
ascribe to them, and that this change undermines their intended speaker role.
The degree to which the conditions for illocutionary success are undercut by
suspicions on the side of the audience that speech acts are latently strategically
motivated will depend on the features of the situation — in particular, on what is
at stake in the strategic interaction between the speaker and the surveillance
agents, how likely it is that surveillance is taking place, and whether the speaker
and the audience know about this. At least in some cases, however, this
suspicion can lead to a situation where the audience is justified in provisionally
treating the speaker’s claims as strategic moves.
At this point, it might be helpful to compare the surveillance case with two
other situations that also involve the interaction between strategic actors and
public deliberation. A first situation is one in which government agencies or
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corporations transparently enter into public deliberative processes to gauge the
degree of public support for various policies they might implement. This case is
structurally similar to the surveillance case, except for the major difference that,
what is of interest is typically how many people have certain attitudes towards a
policy but not who those people are. While such consultations can have dis-
course-undermining effects if the stakes are high enough to motivate people to
misrepresent their actual beliefs to further their personal interests, typically they
do not give speakers a reason to try to strategically manipulate their own
contribution in order to generate information about themselves as individuals.
A second situation is one in which government official or corporate representa-
tives actively engage with the public to argue for policies they support. Even
though this case also involves strategic actors listening, this case is less trou-
bling, as even the strategic participants must recognize that they can sway the
opinions of their interlocutors only by presenting reasoned arguments. In this
situation, the speaker position of the genuinely communicatively participants is
not undermined.
Both cases contrast with the surveillance case insofar the latter introduces
specific, powerful changes in the role of the originally communicatively moti-
vated speakers. I will now argue that if this danger is realized, the speakers do
not receive the intended uptake by the audience.
Of course, it is still true that their original, communicative intention will
continue to be recognized by the audience. However, while this has traditionally
been held to be sufficient for a speech act’s receiving uptake, authors such as
Rebecca Kukla have more recently argued for speech act theoretic models that
do not support this conclusion. According to Kukla,
[t]he uptake of a speech act is others’ enacted recognition of its impact on social space.
Intentions in speaking are part of the story that gives a speech act the performative force it
has, but they are not privileged or definitive; The speaker may only discover, in how her
utterance is taken up, what sort of speech act it really was. (2014, p. 444)
Kukla argues that the force of a speech act is not exclusively constituted by the
audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention (which comes after the speech
act as a separate event). This force is rather constituted by ‘responsive action’ on
the part of the audience (Kukla 2014, p. 454) which can even constitute the
speech act as one that the speaker did not intend even if the audience correctly
recognizes the intention (Kukla 2014, p. 445; see also Cooke 1997, p. 61 for a
similar interpretation of Habermas). This leads to a new understanding of
silencing (see also Tanesini 2018) that is helpful for analyzing the case of
surveillance. If, due to the presence of strategically motivated listeners, a
discourse situation has changed such that even the communicatively motivated
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parts of the audience have reason to treat speech acts as potentially latently
strategically motivated, the link between those speech acts and their intended
normative effects becomes weakened or even severed. This undermines the
ability of speakers (even if they reject any strategic conception of their commu-
nicative role) to perform the intervention into the space of reasons that they
want to affect, thereby silencing them.
This long detour through speech act theory has been necessary for arriving
at a nuanced and empirically adequate way to understand how surveillance can
lead to a form of colonization in the sense described by Habermas. Habermas
argues that the intrusion of the market and the political system into the com-
municatively structured lifeworld undermines the normative capacities of that
mode of interaction via the restructuring of social relations through the domi-
nance of strategically defined roles (of the consumer or the welfare state client,
in Habermas’s examples). Similarly, surveillance by strategically motivated
actors can restructure deliberative relations when audiences can assume that it
is rational for speakers to latently endorse strategic motives. The intrusion of
strategic motivations undermines the binding force of communication and
thereby the legitimizing force of political discourse for, among other things,
the surveillance policies themselves. This is not only a legitimation problem; by
forcing such role-understandings onto participants, uninvited surveillance also
diminishes the collective freedom of deliberating groups (see also Stahl 2016).
Furthermore, as the contributions by feminist philosophers of language show,
the way in which speakers are silenced through these colonization processes
also allows us to understand surveillance as a violation of those forms of
individual liberty that are constitutive of the public realm.
5 Conclusion
What, then, is wrong with surveillance of the political public sphere? I have
argued that surveillance practices where agents monitor public speech, identify
speakers and treat their speech as testimony about their beliefs, is particularly
problematic for the public sphere in a way in which other forms of interaction
between governmental and corporate agents and the public are not. We only
capture the full harm done by such practices — and thus the full justification for
imposing legal limitations on them — once we shift our focus beyond their
effects on individuals and focus on the collective value of intentionally public
activities. The argument presented in this article is that surveillance of contri-
butions to public deliberation harms collective practices in various ways. First, it
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introduces strategic action orientations into a communicative situation and
thereby eliminates the possibility of a fully communicative speech situation,
constraining the collective liberty of the participants. Second, by making it
reasonable for participants to attribute latently strategic motives to each other,
it undermines the trust necessary for unconstrained deliberation. Third, in
severe cases, it leads to a situation in which speakers fail to secure the necessary
uptake for their intended speech acts and can thereby be constrained in their
ability to perform these acts. All of these harms additionally lead to the dimin-
ishment of the public sphere’s capacity to critically evaluate political decision-
making, to inform formal democratic procedures and to generate legitimacy.
While the argument has to be further developed to be directly applicable to
policy and jurisprudence, one can at least draw some immediate conclusions. First,
in contrast to other arguments which focus on the way in which people’s personal
liberties at least partially depend on them not being under surveillance in public
space, this argument suggests a particular need for protection of those public
interactions which are necessary for a functioning democracy. It makes a distinc-
tion between the surveillance of democratic political debate and other forms, such
as the large-scale monitoring of commercial interactions, of consumption practices
or of traffic. While the latter types of surveillance might be problematic for other
reasons, they pose a less direct danger to democratic legitimacy.
As the argument focuses on the preservation of a capacity present in the
public sphere, not its exercise, it suggests, second, that the practice of public
deliberation is prima facie worthy of special legal protection. There are, of
course, forms of political speech—such as racist hate speech or the advocacy
of terrorism—that merely appear to be forms of communicative action, but in
fact violate the requirements of deliberative openness to such a degree as to lose
any special claim to protection. In such cases, where the opportunities offered
by the public sphere are abused to plan its demise, the need to protect the
foundations of democracy clearly overrides the prima facie argument against
surveillance. At the same time, one should be conscious that the deliberative
practices of subordinate groups in particular have historically rarely conformed
to idealized descriptions. To apply the argument to actually existing democratic
debates, lawmakers and courts should therefore adopt a rather wide definition
of the public sphere and be aware of the context of unequal power in which
many forms of political deliberation take place.
Third, the main risk that the argument presented in the article identifies is not
one which concerns particular instances of surveillance. The occasional surveil-
lance of public events or forms of surveillance in which information is only
generated for short-term use may not rise to the level of endangering the function-
ing of the public sphere. Rather, the argument concerns the proliferation of
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systematic surveillance of public deliberation combined with long-term data
retention and its effect on public interaction. Rather than focusing on individual
cases, one ought to adjudicate the permissibility of surveillance from the perspec-
tive of the total sum of surveillance practices in a society (see the concept of a
‘total sum of surveillance’ (‘Überwachungsgesamtrechnung’) adopted as a stand-
ard by the German Constitutional Court in Bundesverfassungsgericht (2010); see
Roßnagel 2010).
Finally, the argument points to a fundamental normative dilemma of sur-
veillance practices in the public sphere: If the justification of surveillance
policies depends on their democratic legitimation, the fact that their enactment
endangers the very conditions of the possibility of such legitimation suggests
that there is a limit to what forms of public surveillance are compatible with
democracy, even if they are supported by majorities.
The democratic defense of privacy presented here is a part of a larger overall
argument for privacy in public. It is limited to a subset of public activities —
namely those that constitute the public sphere in the Habermasian sense — but
it suggests that those practices should command the particular attention of
lawmakers, the courts and a concerned public.
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